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THE PROPERTY PLATFORM IN ANGLOAMERICAN LAW AND THE PRIMACY OF THE
PROPERTY CONCEPT
Donald J. Kochan*
ABSTRACT
This Article proposes that the property concept, when reduced to
its basic principles, is a foundational element and a useful lens for
evaluating and understanding the whole of Anglo-American private
law even though the discrete disciplines—property, tort, and
contract—have their own separate and distinct existence.
In this Article, a broad property concept is not focused just on
things or on sticks related to things but instead is defined as relating
to all things owned. These things may include one’s self and all the
key elements associated with this broader set of things owned—
including the right to exclude, ownership, dominion, authority, and
the sic utere maxim—normally segregated to our discussions of
property law, but that should be considered equally necessary to
contract and tort law.
In examining these property concepts, this Article goes further to
contend that ownership in the self has a vital place in the property
discussion. Every legal system must decide the level of protection or
recognition of property in the self before it can make any decision on
what rules to create in relation to real property, tort or contract. The
rules in all three develop on their own but each can be measured from
their consistency or deviation from a starting base of absolute
property ownership in the self. Once we understand that the platform
for each of these areas of law is based in the property concept, so too
can we then have a metric for discussion to evaluate deviations from
pure property principles that develop in each doctrine (or separate
* Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. B.A., Western Michigan University,
1995, J.D., Cornell Law School, 1998. I appreciate the valuable comments and support of Jennifer
Spinella. I also thank Stephen Lewis for research assistance.
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discipline) thereby allowing us to also isolate the most unique
characteristics attributable only to a discrete subject like contract or
tort. But understanding that the property concept is at the base of all
three legal species—property, contract and tort—is nonetheless the
necessary starting point for an understanding of any of them.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Article is to propose and defend one simple
proposition: In the Anglo-American legal system, if we do not at a
minimum understand the legal concept of property, we cannot know
the law. Certainly, some will say this opening statement is bold or
incorrect. Others will just as certainly say that it is a broad statement
but hardly bold, shocking, or worth devoting the time to read further.
Whether bold or broad, it is a proposition worth a few pages of
attention precisely because it is a statement not sufficiently examined
in explicit terms.
What this Article terms the “property concept” focuses on the
principal components of ownership, dominion, and the right to
exclude. Its primary focus is on the property concept’s influence on
the Anglo-American private law triumvirate—the law of property,
contracts, and torts. This Article discusses the interconnectedness of
property, torts, and contracts based on fundamental parts of this
“property concept.” This property concept includes ownership not
just in things but also in the self and all things that result from the use
of the self. As such, the property concept and its right to exclude
form the platform for far more than just property law. The concept
also functions in the recognition of contracts, which require
ownership and authority to transfer that are based in property, and for
the identification of torts or wrongs, which necessarily require an
interference with broadly defined property. The property concept is a
primary and necessary precondition for the existence of and
understanding of contract and tort law.
This Article proposes that the property concept, when reduced to
its basic principles, forms the foundational elements of, and provides
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a useful lens for, evaluating the purposes of Anglo-American private
law. It has didactic utility to understanding the whole of AngloAmerican private law even though the discrete disciplines—property,
tort, and contract—have their own separate and distinct existences.
At a conceptual, embryonic level, each is dependent on the principles
of ownership, dominion, and the right to exclude, which are uniquely
grounded in the property concept.
These principles become particularly useful for explanatory
purposes when the concept of property is given a broad definition.
This Article defines the property concept as encompassing ownership
principles over things or sticks related to things and to all other things
owned, including one’s self and all of the sticks associated with this
broader set of things owned. This broader concept adopts the
conception of property embraced by James Madison in his 1789
essay, Property, which takes an expansive view of the meaning of
that term to include the self.1
This Article contends that every legal system faces a decision on
what property means, what ownership means, and the level of
protection of one’s ownership of the self. As such, the level of
protection or recognition of property in the self becomes a necessary
part of that system’s legal foundation. This property concept then
forms a platform upon which many other doctrines grow, including
property, contract, and tort.2 Each species of law has and will develop
1. James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 266 (Robert Rutland et al. eds., 1983).
2. Interestingly, Professor Henry Smith used the word “platform” and made a seemingly similar
statement in a very recent article. See Henry E. Smith, Property as a Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV.
1691, 1691 (2012) (“Property is a platform for the rest of private law.”). As I began to read Smith’s
piece, after having completed the accepted draft of this Article, I became worried that perhaps I was
witnessing what Steven Johnson describes as “the multiple.” STEVEN JOHNSON, WHERE GOOD IDEAS
COME FROM: THE NATURAL HISTORY OF INNOVATION 34 (2010) (describing as more common than one
might think, near simultaneity in scientific or other discovery by multiple persons who discover their
“multiple” only after the fact). Upon completing my reading of Smith’s work, however, I was relieved
to find that we mean quite different things. Unlike here, Smith does not claim that property concepts are
necessary components to each area of private law, nor does he focus on fundamental features of
property as a concept, nor its supply of critical, required parts to private law. Additionally, Smith’s work
does not address the fundamental role of self-ownership in the interconnection that is the subject of this
Article. It is not entirely clear how Smith defines platform or why its usage fits with his overall
conclusions. Instead, his work is focused on why a modular theory of property law—contained in its
own discipline—has lessons or “implications for the rest of private law” and in some way “feeds into”
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and evolve on its own. As they develop, however, the rules in each of
the categories can be judged by or measured against property metrics.
By understanding the property concept as the platform for each of
these areas of law, it becomes possible to evaluate how each one
deviates from pure property principles. With that information, we can
then identify the unique evolutionary characteristics that are
generated in one area of law yet do not develop in others. If we
accept that the property concept is at the base of all three legal
species—property, contract, and tort—then understanding the law of
property, and the property concept, becomes a prerequisite for
understanding any of these subjects.
Part I of this Article briefly cautions the reader on the importance
of the subject at hand.3 The fact that something might seem obvious
or intuitive counsels in favor of reading on. Part II explains the
general importance of learning property law and about the property
concepts discussed in this Article, drawing on various perspectives
on the influence of property law within our legal system and on the
reason for its focus in law school curricula.4 Part III explores the near
endless struggle to define property in any precise or concise
definition.5 The fact that property defies such a definitive definition, I
contend, is in part because of its complexity and breadth.
Part IV surveys the definitional debate and defends the proposition
that there are certain key elements involved in any vision of the
Anglo-American property concept—principally the right to exclude,
dominion, and ownership.6 Part V draws Madison and Locke into the
definitional struggle, describing various contentions in favor of a
broad definition of property that includes persons, the self, and the
products of the self.7 This discussion defends the idea that property
the rest of private law. Smith, supra, at 1723. Smith does not analyze property in the way this Article
will—as a concept or as a necessary foundation or base upon which the rest of private law is built and
depends. Regardless of these differences, Smith’s article does make some very important contributions
to the property discussion; they are just different than those contained in this Article.
3. See discussion infra Part I.
4. See discussion infra Part II.
5. See discussion infra Part III.
6. See discussion infra Part IV.
7. See discussion infra Part V.
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begins with the individual. Then, when you combine the essential
elements of property discussed in Part IV together with the broad
definition of property discussed in Part V, the conclusion should
follow that those essential property concept elements also are at the
bases of contract and tort law. Thus, Part VI closes out the
substantive analysis explaining why property must be considered at
the forefront as a platform for law, upon which contract and tort
depend.8
In the end, this Article may not say anything extraordinary. In fact,
it may seem to only say that which is obvious. Nonetheless, it
provides an analysis and synthesis of a few simple points that, oddly
enough, are not widely covered in the literature. It is first about the
primacy of property,9 and then about the undeniable interconnections
that occur between the bases of property, contract, and tort.
I. TAKE A MOMENT: THE UTILITY OF OBSERVING THE SEEMINGLY
“OBVIOUS”
One may dismiss the subject of this Article as too basic to deserve
serious attention. It should not be approached with that bias. A
discussion here of the basic property concept and its relationship with
other species of law is worthwhile for several reasons.10
First, a standalone article on one way to see how property
necessarily interconnects with contract and tort (not to mention many
other topics of law) is justified because it is a proposition that does
8. See discussion infra Part VI.
9. The self-interested, self-perpetuating, or self-preservation-oriented law professor—whose
principal vocation is in the teaching of the subject of property law and whose market value consequently
is directly proportional with the level of importance recognized for the sustained necessity of his
subject—should, of course, provide the reader with a disclaimer of such predisposition and ask her to
read cautiously with an eye toward the possible biases attendant thereto. Now in my ninth year teaching
the traditional first year course in property, I incorporate that disclaimer here but hope that the analysis
presented herein will stand on its own, and any perception of bias will be overcome.
10. There is a credible claim that if ecosystem analysis can metaphorically apply to law, see J.B.
Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and
Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996), the property concept defined
herein may claim to be a keystone species to the legal ecosystem. On keystone species generally, see
R.T. Paine, A Note on Trophic Complexity and Community Stability, AM. NATURALIST, Jan.–Feb. 1969,
at 91.
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not appear to be succinctly stated and defended in the existing
literature. The coverage of the property concept as a foundational
element in multiple species of legal doctrine has received limited
coverage in the literature. And, where there exists some discussion on
the nature and extent of the interrelationship involving property and
other disciplines, there is disagreement. This Article will explain
why, amidst this discussion, there is still more to add to the literature
on the topic.
Second, even if this Article’s principle thesis seems elementary to
some, we must remember that, in teaching the law, many students are
in an elementary position never having occasion before to think about
such legal concepts and systemic effects.11 First year law students are
yet still lambs amidst the wolves in the legal brush. Thus, the lessons
herein should have utility to that student audience along with those
educators seeking ways to reach that audience in the traditional law
school curriculum.12 The lessons of the property concept and the web
it weaves throughout the core law school courses may indeed be
especially important because it is not obvious to the entering law
student or the person first seriously introduced to the law.
It should also have broad appeal beyond law schools and to a
general understanding of the law for other scholars, policymakers,
and really each individual who is confronted with these pervasive
principles that govern our everyday lives. Understanding that
property components exist in other areas of law can help one better
understand those areas, understand the broader foundations of those
doctrines, and develop arguments within them. If a lawyer is not
thinking of the property concepts in a torts case, for example, he may
fail to fully present the underlying nature of the wrong or the reason
11. The authors of one property textbook caution students that they may be entering undiscovered
territory when it comes to understanding the meaning or justification of property, stating: “Most people
take property for granted, without questioning why it exists. In fact, if someone had asked you last week
why our society recognizes private property, you might have had trouble coming up with a convincing
answer.” JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND R. COLETTA, PROPERTY: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 2
(2009).
12. EDWARD E. CHASE & JULIA PATTERSON FORRESTER, PROPERTY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
QUESTIONS, at xxi (2d ed. 2010) (noting a need in teaching property to be sensitive to “the complexity
of the topic to the newcomer and the changed aptitudes of the newcomers themselves”).
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for recognition of a wrong and may fail to tap into all of the available
arguments of persuasion available to win the case.
Finally, there is a high risk for all of us when we take too many
things for granted without giving the time or attention to subjects,
which at first blush may seem prosaic, unremarkable, simple,
ordinary, or obvious.13 As social psychologist Gustav Ichheiser
warns, “The fact . . . that something is obvious need not mean that it
is explicitly noticed, registered, and scientifically taken into account.
Instead, something of the opposite is true. Obvious facts tend to
remain invisible.”14 Dukeminier et al. explain this in relation to
understanding the origins of property law: “How does property come
to be, and why, and so what? Most of us most of the time take these
questions for granted, which is to say that we take property for
granted. But taking something for granted is not exactly the best path
to understanding it.”15 Admittedly, this Article specifically avoids the
debate on origins of property referenced in this quotation. Putting
aside the issues and debates—about how and why property rights or
regimes emerged,16 or even how property rights are obtained or
acquired,17 or the chicken and egg problem whether property
preceded law or law preceded property—the point made by
Dukeminier et al. is equally instructive to an understanding of the
basic property concept at issue here. The property concept and its
13. Merrill had a similar thought when he wrote about the right to exclude. Thomas W. Merrill,
Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 754 (1998) (also noting that his idea that
“property means the right to exclude others from valued resources,” was not a novel topic but one that
needed to be written nonetheless to clarify the literature); see also id. at 730 (“[F]or those who have
devoted themselves to teaching the law of property, the question is one of intrinsic interest, whether or
not it has any payoff in resolving more immediate concerns.”).
14. GUSTAV ICHHEISER, APPEARANCES AND REALITIES: MISUNDERSTANDING IN HUMAN
RELATIONS 8 (William E. Henry & Nevitt Sanford eds., 1970).
15. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 3 (7th ed. 2010).
16. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV., Winter 1985,
at 73 (describing the origins debate); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of
Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849, 1850 (2007) (demonstrating that this exclusion from analysis
is often necessary in the property literature to proceed to more focus points, stating, “We do not attempt
here to outline any theory of the origins of property”).
17. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459,
460 (2009) (“Perhaps the most enduring question in property is how these various chains of title . . . get
started. How do objects that are not recognized as property or are thought to have no owner enter the
universe of owned objects?”).
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role in the whole of the law is worthy of our exploration and a test of
our understanding precisely because, as Ichheiser further warns,
“Nothing evades our attention as persistently as that which is taken
for granted.”18
We become inattentive to understanding when we reject
exploration of a subject because it seems too familiar or simple.19 In
fact, dismissal of such things as “too obvious” is dangerous to true
understanding, as we may in fact fall into a complacent belief of
understanding rather than an enriched understanding accomplished
through consumption of argument and observation of premises.20 As
such and if nothing else, it is worthwhile to take a moment to
examine the analysis in this Article because “the ordinary may appear
as a fresh discovery even though there is nothing in it we did not
already know. The ordinary unwrapped can surprise us.”21
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF LEARNING PROPERTY LAW GENERALLY
The importance of studying the law of property cannot be
overstated. The legal protection and regulation of people and things
and the divisible rights within them—and all that they touch or that
18. ICHHEISER, supra note 14, at 7–8 (criticizing “the tendency to neglect, or even to ignore, certain
very important facts and problems because those facts and problems appear to be quite obvious”); see
also ALDOUS HUXLEY, THEMES AND VARIATIONS 66 (1950) (“Most human beings have an almost
infinite capacity for taking things for granted.”).
19. Wittgenstein’s words are relevant here:
The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity
and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something—because it is always before one’s
eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact has
at some time struck him.—[sic] And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen,
is most striking and most powerful.
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 129 (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed.
2001).
20. Drawing again from Ichheiser, “the contention that certain facts are ‘quite obvious’ must be
considered not only as meaningless but even far worse than that: as a device for blocking the analysis of
basic phenomena and preventing the incorporation of these phenomena into a theory of human
relations.” ICHHEISER, supra note 14, at 11. To quote Sherlock Holmes: “The world is full of obvious
things which nobody by any chance ever observes.” 1 SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The Hound of the
Baskervilles, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 571, 592 (George Stade ed., Barnes & Noble
Books 2003) (1902).
21. Thomas F. Green, Unwrapping the Ordinary: Philosophical Projects, AM. J. EDUC., Nov. 1991,
at 84, 86–87.
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touches them—requires at the most basic level an understanding of
the ubiquitous property concept that usually begins (in law school at
least) with the core course on property. On the importance of learning
property law, my syllabus always begins with the following excerpt
from Blackstone:
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination,
and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property;
or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion
of the right of any other individual in the universe. And yet there
are very few, that will give themselves the trouble to consider the
original and foundation of this right. Pleased as we are with the
possession, we seem afraid to look back to the means by which it
was acquired, as if fearful of some defect in our title; or at best
we rest satisfied with the decision of the laws in our favour,
without examining the reason or authority upon which those
22
laws have been built.

This quotation from Blackstone serves as an inspiring reminder to
students of the law that they stand in a special position. By enrolling
in law school and taking the required first year property course,
students can consider themselves among those few—a privileged
few—who take the trouble to explore the subject in relative detail
and examine the reasons and authority involved in the system.
The basic course in property obviously introduces “core”
substantive material necessary in the law school curriculum. It also
serves as a well-suited subject for a traditional introduction to the law
and the thinking processes associated with the lawyering task.
Property’s pervasive influence in our lives makes for a fascinating
transformative lens introducing law students to another way to look
at the world and our relations within it.
By becoming part of such few, students of the law (whether
formally “students” or not) can understand that they are, indeed,
22. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 (emphasis added).
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embarking on a journey of engagement with a subject so pervasive in
not only our reality but also in the imaginative, affective, and
intellectual exploration of mankind from either our very point of
existence or at least our first points of becoming subjects of legal
governance. I prefer using this excerpt at the start of the property
course because it encapsulates the importance of understanding
property without necessarily requiring adherence to any preference
for a particular system of rights. It is impossible to escape that
Blackstone later takes certain positions on how a legal system should
look.23 It is also undeniable that there are certain presumptions or
rules favoring one type of property system over another inherent in
the teaching of our law.24 The Anglo-American system has generally
set certain preferences toward private property rights in the creation
and interpretation of its applicable rules.25 But, again, leaving aside
the parts of the quoted material on the absolute nature of property
rights and the right to exclude or the biases inherent in our system,
the well-known quotation from Blackstone can be used to underscore
the unique educative experience involved in the study of property
law.
A survey of leading textbooks on property reveals similar claims
of importance or spurs to enthusiasm for the property subject.26
Students are instructed from the start that the history, prevalence, and
pervasive nature of property make the course uniquely meaningful. A
few examples are instructive. Sprankling and Coletta exclaim that
“life as we know it would be impossible without property.”27
Dukeminier et al. advise that:
As an institution for allocating resources and distributing wealth
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1317 (1993)
(“Blackstone’s paean to private property comports with the mainstream Anglo-American exaltation of
decentralized ownership of land. This vision underlies [much of the history of the development of
American property law].”).
25. Id.
26. For example, one textbook shamelessly begins: “Welcome to the most exciting course you will
take in law school.” ROGER BERNHARDT, PROPERTY: CASES AND STATUTES, at v (1999).
27. SPRANKLING & COLETTA, supra note 11, at 1 (“Look around you. Almost everything you see is
owned by someone. In fact, life as we know it would be impossible without property.”).
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and power, property bears in fundamentally important ways on
central issues in contemporary life; as a body of doctrine, it
discharges these modern-day tasks with rules and concepts
drawn from age-old ways of looking at social relations in an
28
ordered society.

Nelson et al. focus on the storied history of property, explaining:
Property law is, to be sure, ancient in civilization; it is the oldest
branch of Anglo-American law, whose writ of novel disseisin
began our system in the 12th century. But property will be with
us as long as we have a civilization. The uses of property
change; needs change; governing legal principles change. At any
given time and place, there will always be fundamental legal
principles governing rights and duties with respect to land and
goods, and there will always be contemporary applications of
those principles, to make property serve human needs of the
29
time.

Casner et al. make the introductory claim: “Protection of our property
is vital to our sense of security and is a core function of our legal
system.”30
Moving away from the relative neutrality of the textbooks
emphasizing the importance of understanding a property system
generally, many examples in the literature emphasize the critical
nature of the choice of property law to the development of legal
28. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 15, at xxxi.
29. GRANT S. NELSON, WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, CONTEMPORARY PROPERTY,
at vii (3d ed. 2008).
30. A. JAMES CASNER ET AL., CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 1 (5th ed. 2004). Casner et al. explain
that:
Property plays a fundamental role in our society, providing us with material things we
need to sustain life and a base from which we can participate in civic life. For most of us
it does much more. We use our clothes, automobiles, and personal possessions to
differentiate ourselves from one another; we use our property to shelter and nurture our
families; and we use our wealth to support causes we want to promote. Protection of our
property is vital to our sense of security and is a core function of our legal system.
Id.
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systems. For example, Andrew Carnegie’s exhortation that “[u]pon
the sacredness of property civilization itself depends”31 is emblematic
of deeply held beliefs about the importance of the protection of a
capitalistic private property system.
Conversely, examples can be found indicating the importance of
choosing a system against private property. For instance, Marx and
Engels propose the abolition of private property and all its
dehumanizing effects as one of the countervailing struggles in our
treatment of this thing called property:
Communism as the positive transcendence of private property as
human self-estrangement, and therefore as the real appropriation
of the human essence by and for man; communism therefore as
the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e., human)
being—a return accomplished consciously and embracing the
entire wealth of previous development. This communism, as
fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully
developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine
resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between
man and man—the true resolution of the strife between existence
and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation,
between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the
species. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows
32
itself to be this solution.

Such anti-property beliefs are often just as deeply felt and vigilantly
defended as the claims for private property.
The point being that regardless of your preferred system of
property, the choice of a type of property system (including a choice
31. ANDREW CARNEGIE, The Gospel of Wealth, in THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH AND OTHER TIMELY
ESSAYS 18 (Edward Kirkland ed., 1965) (1889); see also, e.g., DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN
NATURE 363 (David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (1740) (“Where
possession has no stability, there must be perpetual war. Where property is not transferr’d [sic] by
consent, there can be no commerce. Where promises are not observ’d [sic], there can be no leagues nor
alliances.”).
32. KARL MARX, Private Property and Communism, in ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS
OF 1844, at 132, 135 (Dirk J. Struik ed., Martin Milligan trans., Int’l Publishers 1964) (1844).
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against recognizing private property at all within a system) and the
rules established within it must be made in a civilized world, and that
choice will undoubtedly have far-reaching implications for man and
society.33 The stakes are high, and the importance of understanding
the property subject is proportionate.
For law students, lawyers, and academics alike, property law must
be understood for its importance both as a traditional introduction to
the law but also as a subject with a pervasive presence in life and
across multiple subject matters that students of the law will encounter
on a regular basis—often without knowing unless they are told to
make the connection or are made acutely aware of the connection
early in their legal studies and develop a discipline to actively look
for it.
III. BASIC DEFINITIONS OF PROPERTY IN AN ANGLO-AMERICAN
SYSTEM
The definition of property can help to start an understanding about
how property is a necessary predicate to the law of contracts, the law
of torts, and a variety of other seemingly distinct disciplines. To
understand the basic “property concept,” we could first look to some
generally accepted definitions of “property” itself. The problem is
that most theorists agree that there is no easy way to answer the
question, “What is property?”34
Although dictionaries have their limitations,35 they can serve as a
useful point of departure. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “property,”
in part, as follows:
33. EDWARD H. RABIN, ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL & JEFFREY L. KWALL, FUNDAMENTALS OF
MODERN PROPERTY LAW 1 (5th ed. 2006) (explaining that “[e]very human society has a property
system”).
34. See, e.g., THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1
(2007) (asking and responding: “What is property? There is a surprisingly wide range of answers to this
basic question” and then proceeding to describe the two conceptions of property as either things or
bundles.); JOHN G. SPRANKLNG, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 1 (2000) (“What is ‘property?’ The
term is extraordinarily difficult to define. One of America’s foremost property law scholars even asserts
that ‘[t]he question is unanswerable.’”).
35. See Donald J. Kochan, While Effusive, “Conclusory” is Still Quite Elusive: The Story of a Word,
Iqbal, and a Perplexing Lexical Inquiry of Supreme Importance, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. (forthcoming
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Property. That which is peculiar or proper to any person; that
which belongs exclusively to one; in the strict legal sense, an
aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and protected by the
government. The term is said to extend to every species of
valuable right and interest. More specifically, ownership; the
unrestricted and exclusive right to a thing; the right to dispose of
a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude
every one else from interfering with it. That dominion or
indefinite right of use or disposition which one may lawfully
exercise over particular things or subjects. The exclusive right
of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing. The highest
right a man can have to anything; being used for that right which
one has to lands or tenements, goods or chattels, which no way
36
depends on another man’s courtesy.

Exclusion, disposal, possession, usage, ownership, dominion, and
exclusivity become key components of the meaning of property.
And, although not specifically used in the definition, there is an
underlying theme of “authority” involved as well in the meaning of
ownership that confers the authority to use and dispose of property.
The Black’s definition continues in part:
The word is also commonly used to denote everything which is
the subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or
intangible, visible or invisible, real or personal; everything that
has an exchangeable value or which goes to make up wealth or
estate. It extends to every species of valuable right and interest,
and includes real and personal property, easements, franchises,
and incorporeal hereditaments, and includes every invasion of
37
one’s property rights by actionable wrong.

2012).
36. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1095 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
37. Id. (emphasis added).
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This list of ancillary characteristics of property helps further
underscore the authority theme and importantly introduces the flavors
of transfers and wrongs.
The Black’s Law Dictionary definition is packed with a broad and
powerful definition of property. The Black’s definition has expanded
since Bryan Garner took over as editor with the Seventh Edition of
Black’s (which is now in its Ninth Edition). As one observer notes,
Garner’s definition is broad enough so that we can see the concept of
property and its variations rather than providing any precise
definition.38 The Black’s definition looks at property more in line
with it being a concept than an easily definable term. Furthermore, it
is clear from reading the Black’s definition that there is not a concise
dictionary definition of the term property. In fact, given the richness
of the concepts involved, it is difficult to create or conceive of one.
Nonetheless, the definitional debate has been prevalent in the
literature. One thing we know is that there exists a now longstanding
debate on whether property should be defined as related to “things”
or whether it relates to a “bundle of rights.”39 Still today even these
camps have split into factions, have detractors, and have scholars
searching for new concepts, such as a “property prism” to define

38. Roy M. Mersky & Jeanne Price, The Dictionary and the Man: The Eighth Edition of Black’s
Law Dictionary, Edited by Bryan Garner, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 719, 723–24 (2006). Mersky and
Price explain that:
Multivolume treatises have been written on property; because we understand Garner’s
definition does not mean that we can fathom all of its implications. But the definition of
“property,” and the definitions of related terms that follow, enable us to “see” property in
a legal context and to witness the development of related concepts that have grown out of
the idea of property itself.
Id. at 724.
39. As Sprankling describes it:
The problem arises because the legal meaning of “property” is quite different from the
common meaning of the term. The ordinary person defines property as things, while the
attorney views property as rights. Most people share an understanding that property
means: “things that are owned by persons.”. . . In general, the law defines property as
rights among people that concern things. In other words, property consists of a package
of legally-recognized rights held by one person in relationship to others with respect to
some thing or other object.
SPRANKLNG, supra note 34, at 1–2; see also, e.g., RABIN, KWALL & KWALL, supra note 33, at 1
(contending that “[i]n law . . . the institution of property refers not to the thing that is owned, but to the
legal relations among people with respect to a particular item of wealth”).
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property.40 The Black’s definition has room for many of the
adherents in multiple definitional camps. This things–bundle–prism–
etc. debate exists on a rich, dense, and complicated tapestry,41 and
this Article will neither attempt to fully summarize it nor stitch any
new lines into it.
It is not really necessary to do so for this Article’s purposes.
Rather than focus on the things–bundle debate, this Article will rest
on the assumption that the right to exclude and its related
characteristics must be included in any definition of property. Most
theorists recognize the existence of the right to exclude as either
essential to the very concept of property or at least that it is normally
included in the concept of property, even if not necessary for the
existence of property (and at the very least that our current
conception of private property in the American system is based in a
recognition of the existence and dominance of exclusion theories).42
And it is that right to exclude, and its corresponding components, that
forms the basis for the conclusion that property provides a platform
for understanding all areas of Anglo-American private law.
In essence, I argue that the right to exclude and the corresponding
concepts of ownership and dominion (along with a related concept of
authority) not only lie at the heart of any theory or definition of
property but also that these are essential components to the law of
contract and tort, among others. Thus, the terms right to exclude,
dominion, and ownership that have been used almost exclusively in
40. A recent symposium published in the September 2011 Econ Journal Watch is enlightening on the
richness and complexity of the debate. See Symposium: Property: A Bundle of Rights? Prologue to the
Property Symposium, 8 ECON J. WATCH 193–291 (2011) (including articles authored by Daniel B. Klein
and John Robinson, Eric R. Claeys, Robert C. Ellickson, Richard A. Epstein, Larissa Katz, Thomas W.
Merrill, Adam Mossoff, Stephen R. Munzer, J.E. Penner, and Henry E. Smith).
41. Grey’s formulation of the things–bundles debate is illuminative:
Most people, including most specialists in their unprofessional moments, conceive of
property as things that are owned by persons. To own property is to have exclusive
control of something—to be able to use it as one wishes, to sell it, give it away, leave it
idle, or destroy it. Legal restraints on the free use of one’s property are conceived as
departures from an ideal conception of full ownership. By contrast, the theory of property
rights held by the modern specialist . . . fragments the robust unitary conception of
ownership into a more shadowy “bundle of rights.”
Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69, 69 (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
42. Merrill, supra note 13, at 734.
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the parlance of property deserve equal usage in the other common
law doctrines. Analyzing these terms helps explain why the concept
of property is a vital component in these other areas of AngloAmerican private law.
IV. PROPERTY AND ITS CHARACTER (SPECIFICALLY OWNERSHIP,
DOMINION, AND THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE)
As one group of scholars wisely noted, “Regardless of the
philosophical perspective through which one views the concept of
property, the concept of property does have one unifying or
necessary characteristic—the right to exclude.”43 Most scholars agree
that the right to exclude is the principal component in the private
property concept.44 Because the right to exclude is universally
present across theories of property,45 one need not subscribe to an
absolutist view or a natural rights view to apply the right to exclude
principles across all forms of property. Thomas Merrill has
extensively and effectively discussed the right to exclude and its
place in property law. He concludes that the right to exclude “is the
sin qua non. Give someone the right to exclude others from a valued
resource, i.e., a resource that is scarce relative to the human demand
for it, and you give them property. Deny someone the exclusion right
and they do not have property.”46 The right to exclude means that
individuals may grant or withhold permission to property—in other
words, the right to include is a necessary extension of the right to
exclude.47
43. H. WILSON FREYERMUTH ET AL., PROPERTY AND LAWYERING 7 (2d ed. 2006).
44. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES, at xxxix
(5th ed. 2010) (“[M]ost scholars agree that the right to exclude is either the most important, or one of the
most important, rights associated with ownership.”); J. GORDON HYLTON ET AL., PROPERTY LAW AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (3d ed. 2007) (“Since Blackstone’s time, the AngloAmerican legal tradition has honored this view, but the boundaries of the right of property have not
always been easy to define.”).
45. RABIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 2 (“All theories of property recognize that the right to exclude
others is an important attribute of property.”).
46. Merrill, supra note 13, at 730.
47. Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 374 (1954) (“[T]hat is
property to which the following label can be attached: To the world: Keep off X unless you have my
permission, which I may grant or withhold. Signed: Private citizen[.] Endorsed: The state[.]”);
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The American system of private property is grounded in beliefs in
its equalizing nature and reciprocity—in benefits and burdens—
among equals. Much of that law draws from the insights of David
Hume in that regard. Hume posited, “It is only a general sense of
common interest; which sense all the members of the society express
to one another, and which induces them to regulate their conduct by
certain rules.”48 Hume continues to explain that self-interested
individuals will “leave another in the possession of his goods,
provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me.”49 James
Madison also similarly explained this concept of reciprocity when he
described the necessity that one may use their property in such a
manner only as to leave every other man the “like advantage.”50
The right to exclude operates within this concept of dominion with
reciprocal rights and obligations of ownership. The right to exclude is
“[a]t the very heart of property” and is property’s “singular
conceptual core.”51 Under almost any “bundle” conception of
property, each of the sticks is dependent on recognition of the right to
exclude.52 The Supreme Court has described the “right to exclude”
recognition as fundamental to property on several occasions.53
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 15, at 88–89 (“Felix Cohen’s notion of property [is] a relationship
among people that entitles so-called owners to include (that is, permit) or exclude (that is, deny) use or
possession of the owned property by other people. . . . [T]he right to include—to sell, for example, to
another . . . does not of itself result in a fully effective power to transfer. The right to exclude is needed
as well. The two rights are the necessary and sufficient conditions of transferability.”); see also Hanoch
Dagan, Exclusion and Inclusion in Property Law (June 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1416580.
48. HUME, supra note 31, at 314–15; see also Madison, supra note 1, at 266 (explaining the concept
of “equal advantage”).
49. HUME, supra note 31, at 315; see also Madison, supra note 1, at 266.
50. Madison, supra note 1, at 266.
51. O. Lee Reed, What is “Property”?, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 459, 487–88 (2004) (“If having ‘property’
means anything, historically and legally, it is that the owner can exclude others from the resource owned
and that others have a duty not to infringe this right.”).
52. Id. at 488–89 (“[T]he positive ‘bundle’ of rights like possession, use, and alienation can all be
derived from the negative exclusionary right. . . . [I]f an owner can legally exclude others from
interfering with the resources of her land, she can possess the land, use it in a myriad of ways that leave
an equal right in others to use their resources, or transfer it through sale, lease, or gift to others.”).
53. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673
(1999) (“The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others.”); Int’l News Serv.
v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“Property depends upon
exclusion by law from interference.”); see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)
(“[O]ne of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as
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The right to exclude is the basis for the controlling axiom in
American property law that “each one must so use his own as not to
injure his neighbor—sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas—[which] is
the rule by which every member or society must possess and enjoy
his property.”54 Stated differently, one may act as they wish so long
as they internalize the costs of their actions, thereby respecting others
by not imposing negative externalities—costs imposed on another as
a result of one’s use of his property.55 This freedom from negative
externalities is simply a consequence of a respect for the right to
exclude, and the effective control of externalities is a fundamental
basis of property law.56 Demsetz describes this concept well when he
explains that “[a] primary function of property rights is that of
guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalization of
externalities.”57
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has explained that “the very
essence of government” is the social compact’s authorization for “the
establishment of laws requiring each citizen to so conduct himself,
and so use his own property, as not unnecessarily to injure
another,”58 as expressed in this sic utere maxim. Related adages
include that “your right to swing your arm ends at the tip of my
property—the right to exclude others.”); Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“An essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude
others from enjoying it.”).
54. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 145 (1876); see also Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of
Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348 (1967).
55. Demsetz, supra note 54, at 347 (“It is important to note that property rights convey the right to
benefit or harm oneself or others. . . . [P]roperty rights specify how persons may be benefited or harmed,
and, therefore, who must pay whom to modify the actions taken by persons. The recognition of this
leads easily to the close relationship between property rights and externalities.”). See generally Donald
J. Kochan, Runoff and Reality: Externalities, Economics, and Traceability Issues in Urban Runoff
Regulation, 9 CHAP. L. REV. 409 (2006).
56. Demsetz, supra note 54, at 348; see also Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two
Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453, 486 (2002) (“A number of patterns
in property rights can be explained as variation along the methods of delineation, reflecting their
respective costs and benefits.”); DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 15, at 46 (“‘Externality,’ Demsetz says,
‘is an ambiguous concept.’ It is also an important one that you will be confronting more than
occasionally [in the study of property law].”).
57. Demsetz, supra note 54, at 348. See generally Fred S. McChesney, What’d I Say?: Coase,
Demsetz and the Unending Externality Debate (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law Law & Econ. Research Paper
Series, Paper No. 04-01, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=491182.
58. Munn, 94 U.S. at 124.
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nose,”59 or alternatively, “[m]y property rights in my knife allow me
to leave it where I will, but not in your chest.”60 The sic utere maxim
and reciprocal rights have long been recognized as foundational and
natural regulations of one’s liberty.61 When one looks at the sic utere
maxim in a broad sense, it need not be limited to property law.
Although it involves the basic exclusion rights understood as
grounded in property, it is equally applicable to understand the
rationale for identifying most of the wrongs we call torts. Moreover,
it is the inverse of the exclusion right and the use of one’s property so
as not to harm—that is, the bargained for inclusion right—that forms
the basis for contract. By first identifying what each individual owns
and has the right to control and to exclude, we can then understand
what individuals have the authority to trade or contract for or against.
The concept of nemo dat quod non habet—”[n]o one gives what he
does not have”—follows as based in the basics of ownership yet a
necessary starting position to trade or alter rights for any transaction
as well.62
One need not accept the absolutist notions of Blackstone’s view of
private property rights nor his beliefs in their origin to regard it as
having an enduring value as to the basic right to exclude. The right to
exclude is susceptible to limits and always has been so. The fact that
it is susceptible to limits is not debilitating in any way to its use as a
starting point for identifying the underlying bases for property, tort,
and contract law. It simply means that the scope of the right to
exclude can be defined and limited by law. Recognizing property as
an exclusionary right does not require that it be an absolute and
unlimited one—it is subject to legitimate controls and functions of

59. Boissonneault v. Mason, 221 N.W.2d 393, 393 (Mich. 1974).
60. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 171 (1974).
61. John Trenchard & Thomas Gordon, An Enquiry into the Nature and Extent of Liberty; with its
Loveliness and Advantages, and the Vile Effects of Slavery, in 1 CATO’S LETTERS 244, 245 (Leonard W.
Levy ed., Da Capo Press, Da Capo Press Reprint Ed. 1971) (1733) (“By Liberty, I understand the Power
which every Man has over his own Actions, and his Right to enjoy the Fruit of his Labour, Art, and
Industry, as far as by it he hurts not the Society, or any Members of it, by taking from any Member, or
by hindering him from enjoying what he himself enjoys.”).
62. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1849 (9th ed. 2009).
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the government aimed at regulation of the use of property and the
protection of reciprocal rights of others.63
The existence of state limits does not relieve us of the necessity of
asking about the right to exclude. The right to exclude need not be
cast in absolute terms to serve its utility. Even Blackstone’s own
work does not portray the right to exclude as absolutely absolute.64
Yet, the absolutist vision, even if only as a rhetorical device,65 has
value. It can at least be seen as a point of departure for property law
and other species of law that rely on the right to exclude. Consider
the following from Goldstein and Thompson:
True to Blackstone’s image of property, the most basic and
defining right remains a landowner’s right to exclude other
people and things from his or her land. Yet there have always
been limits, and the exceptions to a property owner’s right to
exclude are growing in response to humanitarian, equitable, and
political concerns over the “despotic” character of exclusive
rights. The common law also constrains how property owners
use their lands. One landowner’s right to use his land as he sees
fit can clash with the right of a neighbor to do the same, as when
one landowner’s desire to build a factory impinges on a
neighbor’s air quality. Land uses can also impact society’s
interests in the environment and other amenities and values. For
these reasons, the law limits how each property owner uses her
66
land.

63. Reed, supra note 51, at 491–93.
64. FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM 13 (1985) (“Blackstone’s sweeping definition
of the right of property overstated the case; indeed, he devoted the succeeding 518 pages of Book 2 of
his Commentaries . . . to qualifying and specifying the exceptions to his definition.”). See generally
Robert P. Burns, Blackstone’s Theory of the “Absolute” Rights of Property, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 67
(1985) (explaining that Blackstone did not believe exclusion was absolutely absolute).
65. Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 603–04
(1998) (calling Blackstone’s usage an “Exclusivity Axiom” that is “a rhetorical figure describing an
extreme or ideal type rather than reality”).
66. PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., PROPERTY LAW: OWNERSHIP, USE, AND
CONSERVATION 2–3 (2006).
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This is true for its application to property, torts, and contracts without
consequence to the conclusions in this Article. We have to ask what
the right to exclude entails in light of surrounding and developed law,
but we nonetheless must at least ask about the right to exclude in the
first instance.
Merrill does an excellent job describing the right to exclude and its
importance in understanding the principles of property,67 but he does
not expressly extend the right to exclude to encompass contract and
tort. In fact, elsewhere, Merrill and Smith focus on why the law of
property must be considered distinct from the law of contracts or the
law of torts.68 I believe that at its most fundamental level, however,
the right to exclude is indeed integral to an understanding of
contracts, torts, and some other areas of Anglo-American law.
Moreover, Merrill and Smith, though focusing on the right to
exclude,69 fail to direct their attention to a broad property concept
that includes ownership in the person. Ellickson aptly describes the
limitations of their work in this regard, explaining that “because
Merrill and Smith define ‘property’ as an entitlement in a ‘thing’ as
opposed to a ‘person’, they are unwilling to refer to a person’s rights
in his own body, labor, and reputation as property.”70 The next Part
illustrates that a broader definition of the property concept—focused
not just on things or on sticks related to things but instead on all
things owned, such as one’s self and all the sticks associated with this
broader set of things owned—is a useful exercise to understand the
role of property principles as they apply more broadly in the
development of Anglo-American law, including in the otherwise
separate categories of property, contract, and tort.
Ellickson also commented on the analytical power of property
concepts to clarify “momentous legal issues” outside of the core
subject of real property and things—”it is not apparent why property
67. See generally Merrill, supra note 13.
68. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 378–79 (2001) (emphasizing their belief that the property focus must
be on in rem).
69. Id.
70. Robert C. Ellickson, Two Cheers for the Bundle-of-Sticks Metaphor, Three Cheers for Merrill
and Smith, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 215, 219 (2011) (citation omitted).
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scholars should cede, on the altar of definitional purity, this entire
territory to other legal specialists.”71 The next Parts elaborate on that
idea (where Ellickson did not) and explain that the broader property
concept has a strong basis in factual connection with these other
areas and is a platform, upon which much of the law is based.
V. THE BROAD PROPERTY CONCEPT: THE LOCKEAN–MADISONIAN
DEFINITION OF PROPERTY
From an understanding of the preeminence of the right to exclude
within property law, it is useful to think broadly about what is or is
not property, to which the right to exclude attaches. One useful lens
comes through the Lockean–Madisonian conception of property as
including all things to which we have ownership or dominion,
including our bodies, ourselves, and the fruits of the labor generated
from the use of the property in ourselves. If we take this broad
meaning of property, we can begin to see the paramount need to
understand the property concept in relation to all legal doctrines that
affect not just things, like land, houses, or our personal possessions,
but also the property that we hold so dear in our very lives, including
the freedom to use our person in any way we wish.
This concept of property is well-embedded in our constitutional
traditions and in the role of limited government envisioned by John
Locke, James Madison, and others.72 John Locke emphatically
proclaimed, “The great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into
common-wealths, and putting themselves under government, is the
preservation of their property. To which in the state of nature there
are many things wanting.”73 In the state of nature, there are no neutral
71. Id.
72. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
29 (1985) (“It is very clear that the founders shared Locke’s and Blackstone’s affection for private
property, which is why they inserted the eminent domain provision in the Bill of Rights.”); James W.
Ely, Jr., The Constitution and Economic Liberty, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, Winter 2012, at 27, 29–
30 (“John Locke and the Whig emphasis on the rights of property owners profoundly influenced the
founding generation.”). For a discussion of the role that the protection of property rights has played in
U.S. history, see generally Douglas W. Kmiec, The Coherence of the Natural Law of Property, 26 VAL.
U. L. REV. 367 (1991).
73. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 124, at 66 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett
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third party protections for man’s right to exclude—meaning that an
individual’s belongings, including his person, could face intrusion
without recourse. At the very least then, a limited government is
necessary to provide the requisite protections so that the general
attributes inherent in the very nature of private property and
ownership of self and things could manifest without chaos. Critical to
these necessary functions of government are the recognition of rules
governing property, contracts, and torts.
James Madison observed this essential correlation between
property and the state when he wrote, “Government is instituted to
protect property of every sort. . . . This being the end of government,
that alone is a just government, which impartially secures to every
man, whatever is his own.”74 Madison’s conception of property
within this statement on the proper role of government was broad. In
his rather under-recognized essay from 1789,75 Madison expounded
on a broad meaning of property that defines what this Article is
calling the “property concept.” Madison explained the breadth of the
property concept and its inverse relationship with the scope of
exerted governmental power as follows:
[A]s a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be
equally said to have a property in his rights. Where an excess of
Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690). Locke describes the importance of liberty underlying this protection of
property:
[F]reedom of men under government is, to have a standing rule to live by, common to
every one of that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it; a liberty to
follow my own will in all things, where the rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to
the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man. . . . This freedom from
absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to, and closely joined with a man’s
preservation, that he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits his preservation and life
together.
Id. § 22–23, at 17.
74. Madison, supra note 1, at 266.
75. Madison’s essay is strikingly under-discussed in the literature of American property law. If one
searches Westlaw’s JLR database, for example, she will find less than two dozen citations to this essay
and only a few articles giving anything more than a passing reference to it. Perhaps the absence of much
analysis is because of the resistance to a natural law perspective on the law. But, although presented in
part from a natural law perspective, the concept of property in the person should not be dismissed when
it serves as a useful optic for explaining the interrelationship between property and contract or tort
(along with some other species of law). That explanatory value alone is sufficient, and one need not
adhere to any natural law perspective to recognize that independent utility.
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power prevails, property of no sort is duly respected. No man is
safe in his opinions, his person, his faculties, or his
76
possessions.

Property and liberty are intertwined and the excessive growth of the
state’s power to control any type of property—including real
property, personal property, or the property one has in his person
(and in its attendant characteristics and manifestations)—has vital
implications for liberty to conduct affairs in general.77
Similarly focused on property and the person, Locke explains that
the incentive to work is directly correlated with the confidence in
one’s ability to keep the fruits of his labor.78 Thus, strong private
property rights encourage investment in production and respect for
them “protects private expectations to ensure private investment.”79
Second, delineation of ownership facilitates exchange. Contracting
would be impossible if parties were unable to trade rights.80
Contracting would also be undesirable if one could obtain something
through less costly means, such as through plunder or through
exploitation of a commons when the state fails to protect against
these activities.81 In other words, property must be protected from
aggression in order for civil society to flourish.82 At a minimum,
76. Id.
77. “‘The right of property,’ Arthur Lee of Virginia declared, ‘is the guardian of every other right,
and to deprive a people of this, is in fact to deprive them of their liberty.’” JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE
GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 26 (1992)
(quoting Arthur Lee, An Appeal to the Justice and Interests of the People of Great Britain, in THE
PRESENT DISPUTE WITH AMERICA 14 (4th ed. 1775)).
78. See LOCKE, supra note 73, § 30, at 20.
79. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
80. See G. WARREN NUTTER, POLITICAL ECONOMY AND FREEDOM 102 (Jane Couch Nutter ed.,
1983) (“Markets without divisible and transferable property rights are a sheer illusion. There can be no
competitive behavior, real or simulated, without dispersed power and responsibility.”).
81. On man’s self-interested nature, see THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 60–63 (Liberal Arts Press
1958) (1651). On that nature’s relation to property and contract, see EPSTEIN, supra note 72, at 7–18.
82. This is in many ways consistent with Hume’s concept of property and the role of the state. As
Hume explained: “Where possession has no stability, there must be perpetual war. Where property is not
transferr’d [sic] by consent, there can be no commerce. Where promises are not observ’d [sic], there can
be no leagues nor alliances.” HUME, supra note 31, at 363. Hume reiterates:
We have now run over the three fundamental laws of nature, that of the stability of
possession, of its transference by consent, and of the performance of promises. ‘Tis [sic]
on the strict observance of these three laws, that the peace and security of human society
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therefore, government must have the power to protect these
institutions of property and free exchange.83 As recognized in
Federalist No. 10, “the protection of different and unequal faculties
of acquiring property” is “the first object of [g]overnment.”84
The property concept is essential to our legal system.85 Everything
we touch implicates the basic idea of property. Everything we can or
cannot do is, at its core, dictated by it. If one adopts a broad view of
the meaning of “property,” any and all of our legal relations have the
concept of property at their core. Madison explains this view, in his
essay, Property:
This term in its particular application means “that dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of
the world, in exclusion of every other individual.” In its larger
and juster meaning, it embraces every thing [sic] to which a man
may attach a value and have a right; and which leaves to every
one [sic] else the like advantage. In the former sense, a man’s
land, or merchandize, or money is called his property. In the
latter sense, a man has a property in his opinions and the free
communication of them. He has a property of peculiar value in
his religious opinions, and in the profession and practice dictated
by them. He has a property very dear to him in the safety and
liberty of his person. He has an equal property in the free use of
his faculties and free choice of the objects on which to employ
them. In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his property,
86
he may be equally said to have a property in his rights.

If one takes the broad view of property like Madison, then property is
ever-present in our lives (and indeed life itself is property). It is the
entirely depend; nor is there any possibility of establishing a good correspondence among
men, where these are neglected.
Id. at 337; see also LOCKE, supra note 73, § 7.
83. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 58 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
84. Id.
85. JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN PROPERTY LAW 1
(6th ed. 2007) (“Property law forms an essential component of our common law legal system . . . .”).
86. Madison, supra note 1, at 266.
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constant that fuses together seemingly distinct areas of law in the
complex legal world. A unifying foundation exists between
seemingly distinct species of law based on principles of property,
ownership in the self, and all that extends from the self.
Madison also claims that property, understood broadly, explains
the reciprocal rights and reciprocal obligations that exist between
persons in society vis-à-vis each other’s property (whether that is
toward the property in land or the self or otherwise).87 These
reciprocal relationships form the bases for defining wrongs (torts),
altering default exclusion rules (contracts), and otherwise defining
ownership (property).
Based in the Madisonian conception of property in this broad
context, the Founders understood the constitutional concern for
property to be based in this broad concept, including these facultative
resources of the person.88 The Founders were not concerned with
what has become the modern debate over a stricter definition of
property—property broadly understood was the lodestar in the
relationship between the individual and the state.89
Judge Loren Smith is one of the very few to discuss Madison’s
Property in the legal literature. In his work, Judge Smith has focused
on the importance of the Madisonian conception, arguing that the
“conception that property includes all of the fundamental aspects of
87. Id.
88. Reed, supra note 51, at 477. Reed posits:
The Framers of the United States Constitution, with James Madison at the helm,
assumed the existence of property as a constitutional institution and, further, had a very
broad view of the resources that the term “property” protected. It certainly protected
those resources such as land and goods that traded in the marketplace, but it also
protected facultative resources, that is, the personal resources comprising one’s talents,
efforts, expressions, and practices.
Id.
89. Id. at 477–78. Reed explains the fundamentals:
Importantly, neither Madison nor many other American colonists considered the
“larger and juster meaning” of property to be merely a rhetorical device. Today, it is
fashionable to separate the facultative resources of the person from the nonfacultative
resources externalized and traded in the marketplace and to think of the right to the
former as liberty and as somehow different from, separate from, and superior to the right
to the latter, which is property, but it was not so to the Constitutional Framers who
appreciated property as an institution that legally specified their desired relationship to
the state with regard to all kinds of limited resources, including those of the person.
Id.
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the integrity of the human person, life, liberty and property, the
whole preamble [to the Constitution] is about protecting the citizen’s
rights in property and property in rights.”90 Madison’s unique role in
the creation of the constitutional republic should give his conception
of property special significance.91 The broadest conception of
property equates with giving constitutional liberty protections their
broadest interpretation.92 This broad conception of property
dominated the discussion of its meaning in the jurisprudential
discussions preceding the formation of the U.S. Constitution.93
In this Lockean–Madisonian concept of property, a sound
protection of property rights is fundamental to all other liberties.94
And, importantly, it is vital to the ability to labor and exchange, a
process of using property in one’s self, and to retain the fruits of
those efforts—in other words, to maintain ownership and dominion
over the products of the use of one’s self, including through
90. Hon. Loren A. Smith, Life, Liberty & Whose Property?: An Essay on Property Rights, 30 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1055, 1056 (1996).
91. Hon. Loren A. Smith, Introduction, 46 S.C. L. REV. 525, 526 (1995) (“Madison’s venerable role
in our republic—author of much in the Constitution and a large share of The Federalist; member of the
First Congress, where he was the driving force behind the Bill of Rights; and, of course, our fourth
President—should give much weight to his definition.”). See also William C. Heffernan, Privacy Rights,
29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 737, 772 (1995) (“Madison’s essay, published one year after adoption of the Bill
of Rights, provides helpful guidance when considering the Constitution’s protection of a sphere of
personal autonomy.”); John O. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First
Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV., Winter 1996, at 49, 56–68 (discussing Madison’s definition of property
as the basis for protection of First Amendment concerns).
92. Justice Bradley stated, for example, that:
The words “life,” “liberty,” and “property” are constitutional terms, and are to be taken in
their broadest sense. . . . The term “property,” in this clause, embraces all valuable
interests which a man may possess . . . . It is not confined to mere tangible property, but
extends to every species of vested right. . . . [A] very large proportion of the property of
individuals is not visible and tangible, but consists in rights and claims against others, or
against the government itself.
Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 630 (1885) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
93. Heffernan, supra note 91, at 771 (“Perhaps the most intriguing feature of seventeenth and
eighteenth century discussions of property is the extent to which they involved a broad definition of
their subject.”).
94. The Supreme Court has even stated:
Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property without
unlawful deprivation . . . is in truth, a “personal” right . . . . In fact, a fundamental
interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in
property. Neither could have meaning without the other. That rights in property are basic
civil rights has long been recognized.
Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
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contracts. These are primary conditions for the type of autonomy that
is protected when one has the right to exclude (and the corresponding
right to include or contract away rights to the self or one’s labor),
ownership of the self, and overall dominion over the self against all
others.95 Every alteration of or infringement on property rights
necessarily changes our understanding of the proper role of law vis-àvis all things owned, including one’s self and his liberty, which in the
Madisonian conception are part of the property each individual
owns.96
Any system must decide what ownership in the self means. Every
legal system must decide the level of protection or recognition of
property in the self before it can make any decision on what rules to
create in relation to real property, tort or contract. For these reasons,
the property concept forms a platform upon which many other
doctrines grow, including property, contract, and tort. The rules in all
three develop on their own, but each can be measured from their
consistency or deviation from a starting base of absolute property
ownership in the self. Once we understand that the platform for each
of these areas of law is based in the property concept, we can then
have a metric for discussion to evaluate deviations from pure
property principles that develop in each doctrine (or separate
discipline) thereby allowing us to also isolate the most unique
characteristics attributable only to a discrete subject, like contract or
tort. But understanding that the property concept is at the base of all
three legal species—property, contract, and tort—is nonetheless the
necessary starting point for an understanding of any of them.

95. Justice Joseph Story has stated:
That government can scarcely be deemed to be free, where the rights of property are
left solely dependent on the will of a legislative body, without any restraint. The
fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require; that the rights of personal
liberty and private property, should be held sacred.
Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657 (1829).
96. As the Supreme Court posited in one case, “Individual freedom finds tangible expression in
property rights.” United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 61 (1993).
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VI. A REQUIRED UNDERSTANDING: WHY THE “PROPERTY CONCEPT”
HAS A PRIVILEGED STATION IN THE WHOLE OF ANGLO-AMERICAN
PRIVATE LAW
Throughout history, “property has been the most important
subdivision of the field of law.”97 This Article posits that property
exists as the platform of law, upon which other fields rely and launch
their own doctrines from. The literature is filled with passing
references to interconnectivity of law. Some, for example, have
described the law as a seamless web, although that view has its
degrees of criticism.98
Some discuss specifically the link between property and other
areas of law. A few examples are worth noting. William Howard Taft
described “indissoluble” links between property, contract, and
liberty.99 Friedrich Hayek proclaimed, “Law, liberty, and property are
an inseparable trinity.”100 Richard Epstein describes an “abiding
intellectual unity” between property, contract, and tort.101 Epstein
succinctly describes the relationship: “Property law governs
acquisition of the rights persons have in external things and even in
themselves. Torts governs protection of the things reduced to private
ownership. Contracts governs transfer of the rights so acquired and
protected.”102 Freedom of contract indeed is dependent on the right of
property.103 And the overlap between the features of property and the
features of torts or wrongs is evident throughout the law.104
97. TOM BETHELL, THE NOBLEST TRIUMPH: PROPERTY AND PROSPERITY THROUGH THE AGES 20
(1998) (arguing property has had primacy in law “[si]nce Roman times”).
98. F.W. Maitland, A Prologue to a History of English Law, 14 L.Q.R. 13, 13 (1898) (discussing law
as forming an organic unity, while stating that “[s]uch is the unity of all history that any one [sic] who
endeavours to tell a piece of it must feel that his first sentence tears a seamless web”).
99. William H. Taft, The Right of Private Property, 3 MICH. L.J. 215, 218 (1894) (“[W]e inherited
from our English ancestors the deep seated conviction that security of property and contract and liberty
of the individual are indissolubly linked, as the main props of higher and progressive civilization . . . .”).
100. F.A. HAYEK, 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 107 (1973).
101. EPSTEIN, supra note 72, at vii.
102. Id.
103. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 280 (5th London ed. 1864) (“The
right of property includes, then, the freedom of acquiring by contract.”).
104. “We . . . find that many of the most fundamental constitutive features of the law of property are
actually found in the law of wrongs, both civil and criminal.” J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN
LAW 74 (1997).
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The major areas of private law admittedly have grown into distinct
disciplines, but from the embryonic level, they rely on the basic
principle of property to mature. At their conception, each was
dependent, in whole or in part, on the property concept defined by the
right to exclude or include, ownership, and dominion.
Although many scholars note the connections, they do not go as
far as to describe a property platform, upon which most of the other
areas of law must emerge. Under the accepted, limited definitions of
property, many see correlations and overlaps between property,
contracts, and torts,105 but few defend the proposition that contracts
and torts are dependent on the definition of property.
Some scholars recognize similarities between property, torts, and
contracts but are stuck on the idea that property relates only to
“things” as a reason to limit their discussion of property’s place in
contract and tort law. This Article has already discussed this
limitation of the work of Merrill and Smith.106 Stoebuck and
Whitman provide an example of such “things”-based thinking that
prevents some from pursuing the property concept in contracts and
torts when describing the Second Restatement of Property approach:
What distinguishes “property” from “personal” interests is that
“property” interests (1) relate to “things”—land, chattels, and
intangible “things”—and (2) are usually protected by law against
an indefinitely large number of persons (“the world”). Some
“personal” interests are protected against an indefinitely large
number of persons but do not relate to “things”—e.g., the
interest in freedom from personal injury caused by the
105. For example, although not focusing on a theoretical property concept, the ALI Restatement effort
recognized some level of property’s connection with many other subjects:
At this moment in history Property seems a far less coherent intellectual subject than
Contracts or Torts. There is much greater variation in what is included in introductory
law-school courses. Most Property cases are also Contracts or Torts cases, and some—for
example, enforcement of landlord-tenant regulations—are criminal cases. Real property
as an independent field has become comparatively less important over time, and an
introductory course in Property now considers principles applicable to corporation law, to
environmental law, and to intellectual-property law.
LANCE LIEBMAN, AM. LAW INST., A CONCISE RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, at IV (2001).
106. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
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intentional or negligent acts of others. Other “personal” interests
relate to “things” but are generally enforceable against only one
or a few persons—e.g., the interest in performance of promises
107
made by the other party to a contract.

But this “thing”-based distinction would disappear if we work from
an understanding of property as including the person and the
Madisonian broad definition.108
Because the right to exclude is at the essence of property’s
definition,109 it is often discussed in property law and by property
scholars. But it has vital application in torts and contracts too. As
Merrill and Smith explain, “Together these rights to exclude and
governance rules collectively make up the law of property and
connect property to adjacent areas of contracts, torts, regulation, and
public law,”110 yet their work only references this connection rather
than directly applying the property analysis in these other areas of
law. Moreover, they ultimately focus on a things-based definition
that excludes the broader property concept and its considerations of
the ownership of the self.
O. Lee Reed is one of the few writers to make an explicit case for
property as a fundamental and organizing concept for all of law,
describing the law as a wheel with property as its hub:
In both the theoretical and practical sense, however,
“property” is an enormously significant word. . . . Property and
liberty are intertwined in theory and history, and most of the
subjects of law—contract, tort, criminal prohibition, regulation,
and even much constitutional interpretation—fan out like spokes
from the conceptual hub of property. The implications of these
sweeping assertions both for the private market and those who
107. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 4 (3d ed. 2000)
(describing the Second Restatement of Property view).
108. For the same reasons, we can look past any distinction based on the in rem versus in personam
nature of property and contract laws and remedies as irrelevant.
109. Reed, supra note 51, at 473 (“From this essence, it is possible to define property as a single
negative right, the right of exclusion as applied to limited resources.”).
110. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 34, at v.
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study it, combined with the divergent views of property, suggest
why the meaning of property requires a commonly grasped
111
definition along with its appropriate development.

Reed makes this statement briefly and understates its importance by
only explaining his meaning in a short footnote:
As for the common law, fanning out like radial spokes from the
hub of property are the other divisions of law. Thus, contract
concerns the rules for transferring resources that people own, and
tort establishes duties not to trespass on and to render
compensation for wrongful harm done to such resources. Many
criminal laws punish offenses against an owner’s resources, and
the law of business organizations establishes rules for the joint
private holding of resources. Even much constitutional
112
interpretation focuses on property.

This reality of property’s position is more than rhetorical, and the
failure to appreciate this hub-like relationship results only because
we choose to define property institutions and specific property rules
as distinct from other fields of law.113
Coval, Smith, and Coval state in a similar manner the same basic
conclusion, describing property as a means for action and for setting
parameters of wrongful interference:
With property viewed as the protection of means we can more
easily see the underlying unity of the entire civil side of the law:
how property, contract, and tort may be seen as related to the

111. Reed, supra note 51, at 462–64.
112. Id. at 464 n.20.
113. As Reed defends the hub analogy:
The rejection of property as an organizational hub or the tentativeness of support for it
relate to a misunderstanding of the meaning of “property” and confusion between the
definition of the term and certain distributional effects and conditions that likely relate
not to the right of property but to abuses arising from weak and poorly administered
property systems.
Id.
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underlying theme of provision of protection and extension (c.p.)
of (the freedom of) action. If property is a device used to protect
means for action, whether it be the body, physical objects, or
relationships with other people, then the concern of tort law may
be seen to determine when wrongful interference has
occurred . . . . The remainder of the civil side of the law is
constituted by legal practices by which we are able to create
means such as contracts, wills, trusts, estates in land, etc. which
allow persons to extend their agency. These themselves, since
they are means, are also protected from wrongful interference,
114
and consequently are property.

This “protection” theory comes closer to an understanding of
property’s role as a critical element in contract and tort. Yet, neither
Reed, nor Coval, Smith, and Coval, relate the identified connection to
the right to exclude, ownership, dominion, and the related
characteristics of the property concept herein described.
Randy E. Barnett’s explanation of the three areas (property,
contract, and tort) accepts that the property concept is vital to each,
even if the doctrine develops separately:
The law of contracts, property, and torts can be viewed as
defining boundaries within which each person may make her
own choices in pursuit of her own happiness. You are allowed to
do what you wish with what is yours (as defined by property
law), provided that you do not infringe (as defined by tort law)
on the property of others—including the inalienable property
rights one has in one’s own body. Contract law provides the
means by which a person can transfer her property to another by
her consent (although wholly gratuitous transfers are considered

114. S. Coval, J.C. Smith & Simon Coval, The Foundations of Property and Property Law, 45 C.L.J.
361, 474 (1986). “[T]he integration of these three areas of the law around the protections and furtherance
(c.p.) of actions gives us another reason why we cannot separate the right to property from any of our
other basic rights.”). Id. at 475.
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115

to be an aspect of property law, not contracts).

Thus, Barnett’s explanation better captures the idea of self-ownership
as helping define the property concept broadly, and he ultimately
comes close to explicitly indicating that the connection between the
three—property, contract, and tort—is based on traits like exclusion,
ownership, and dominion. In that regard, Barnett proceeds to explain
that each discipline deals with “rightful domain”:
So contract, property, and torts—along with other subjects
such as restitution—can be viewed as providing the legal
boundaries that define the scope of individual liberty and
distinguish rightful from wrongful conduct. To act rightfully is to
remain within one’s boundaries; wrongful conduct is when one
crosses over into another’s rightful domain. . . . Contract,
property, and torts . . . distinguish[] those actions that are
116
nevertheless permissible from those that are not.

Referencing in part similar conclusions by Charles Fried,117 Barnett’s
discussion of “rightful domain” is closely related to the ideas
commonly accepted in property associated with the right to exclude,
ownership, dominion, authority, and the sic utere maxim.
So, we return to consider the three species of Anglo-American law
most at issue in this Article—property, contracts and torts. Each is
architecturally and operationally distinct and does have its own
enclave with different causes of action, different coverage, different
aims, different enforcement, different remedies, and so on. But the
fact that they are distinct does not negate the fact that the concept of
115. Randy E. Barnett, Contract Is Not Promise; Contract Is Consent, SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1792586, at 12.
116. Id.
117. As Barnett explains, Charles Fried has made very similar statements regarding this
interrelationship. For example, Fried has explained that:
“The law of property defines the boundaries of our rightful possessions, while the law of
torts seeks to make us whole against violations of those boundaries, as well as against
violations of the natural boundaries of our physical person. . . . [T]he law of contracts
facilitates our disposing of these rights on terms that seem best to us.”
Id. at 13 (quoting CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 1-2 (1981)).
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property permeates and is critical to the foundation of each. At the
very least there is theoretical–rhetorical weight for property
principles in the formation and evolution of all three species of law—
even if the property concept is not the accepted, proffered
justification for them.
The enforcement of consensual transactions is dependent on a
determination that one has ownership, dominion, and authority to
transfer the good or service involved in that transaction. A court must
necessarily look at those property concepts whenever it is enforcing a
contract. A court must also evaluate in some of those instances
whether someone has exercised his right to include a person on his
property or to use his property in labor for the benefit of another. The
same is true when a court must provide a remedy for nonconsensual
or objectionable acts or for transactions that rise to the level of a
breach of contract or of an actionable tort. The nonconsensual or
objectionable nature will be tested by whether there has been an
intrusion against someone’s right to exclude or an otherwise
unauthorized act on the property or (property in the) person of
another.
A tort is an injury or wrong, but to what is it an injury or wrong?
The injury must be inflicted upon something (property in the self or
sometimes real or personal property), and it must be a wrong for
some reason—because it violates a fundamental right to exclude
others.
A contract is an exchange, but for what is it an exchange? Services
are made by persons who have a choice whether to extend their labor
precisely because they own themselves and the extension of
themselves through labor. Goods are things—property owned by
someone—which can only be lawfully exchanged if the person
holding them and offering them for transfer has the authority to do
so—i.e., property rights and dominion in them. One cannot trade
something in contract unless and until she owns it. Again, the
currency and objects of contract must first be made valid by property
before accepting it as governed by the law of contract.
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I am not contending that the species of private law are entirely
linked, as they have developed over time. Each has developed its
own constituencies, language, and vehicles and is invested in its
separateness. Each is imbued with separate characteristics that have
been manipulated to achieve different social ends. I am contending,
however, that they share a common foundational base—the property
concept and its platform—from which adherence or deviations can be
measured.
Take the example of your fist. If one owns his fist, when he
implants his fist in un-owned ground and improves it, he reduces it
into his dominion, and ownership of that land is recognized in real
property as a result of first possession and labor theory. The
ownership of the land is an extension of the ownership in the self.
Now consider tort law. I cannot implant my fist in another’s face
because it violates that person’s ownership in himself and the
reciprocal right of that person to exclude my fist. Implanting my fist
in pre-owned property constitutes a trespass on real property.
Implanting my fist in another’s face constitutes what looks like a
“trespass” on a person in tort because my ownership of my fist ends
at the tip of another’s ownership in his nose. Yet, because X owns his
fist and Y owns his face, each with reciprocal rights to exclude the
other in the first instance, each also has the right to include the other
so long as the property each owns is alienable. This is the foundation
of contract law and the right of exchange. Contract law governs the
ability to alienate and adjust all or part of the property rights. Hence,
we have the sport of boxing—a legalization of what would otherwise
be a violation of another’s property in the self (or a tort) because of
the exchange of property rights after an alteration of the initial
assignment of those property rights through the contractual
adjustment of the rights to exclude and include.
Of course, none of this requires that we recognize implanting the
fist in land as enforceable real property rights, the implantation of the
fist in the face as a tort, or an agreement to implant fists on each
other’s person a legally sanctioned activity. A legal system could
decide to prohibit such exchanges or not to recognize certain of these
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things as wrongs, and so on. However, in order to make these
decisions about recognizing or not recognizing such rights or
obligations, the level of legal characterization of each of these
activities does require any system to start with a decision on the
contours of property and ownership and what those things mean. The
development of property, contract, and tort rules require a decision
on the level of recognition of the property concept that any system
desires or will tolerate.
Accepting this platform contention as true, an alteration in our
treatment of property principles has rippling effects on the whole of
legal doctrine. As goes property, so goes the rest of the law—because
the substance and character of our principles in property law will
inform the starting assumptions and elements in each of the major
substantive areas of legal doctrine. Property is a species of law that
weaves its way all throughout the legal ecosystem, at least in terms of
its underlying concepts.
The critical terms—the right to exclude, ownership, dominion,
authority, and the sic utere maxim—normally segregated to our
discussions of property law are transferable to the foundations of
contract and tort law and deserve greater application in those
disciplines. Within property law literature, scholars should also
recognize that property scholarship does not have a monopoly on
these terms. It is telling to recognize that contracts and torts scholars
far more often recognize the applicability of property concepts to
their fields than do property scholars recognize the broader
application of their property concepts to other fields. Property
scholarship needs a greater recognition of its place as the platform of
much broader application than what has emerged as the property
discipline. The development of our seemingly atomized property law
can, by altering the base upon which others depend, have substantial
consequences for the stability of the base of other artificially
“distinct” species of law.
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CONCLUSION
The property concept is uniquely fundamental to other areas of
substantive law—particularly other Anglo-American private law
subjects like torts and contracts. These other species of law play on
the property concept field, creating the uniqueness and primacy of
the concept of property in the broader playground of private law.
Understanding the property concept will not mean that one will
understand all the intricacies of contract law or tort law, but you
cannot begin to study effectively the bases for contract law or tort
law without having a grounding in the property concept that forms an
integral part of the foundations of property, tort, and contract law.
Understanding that the property concept is the platform from which
other species of Anglo-American law evolve should aid in
developing a consistent, harmonizing, singular justification for many
of the doctrines that emerge in all three categories and for creating a
baseline for the identification of where these doctrines develop away
from core property principles.
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